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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 4E(A): 
TOOTHLESS “INTERNAL-TIMING DIRECTIVE” OR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION? 
RICHARD E. BRODSKY* 
ABSTRACT 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has a problem, and 
everyone knows it: its investigative process suffers from excessive 
delay, which harms both individuals and entity it investigates and 
its own enforcement program. This problem has long been recog-
nized and complained about, but never remedied. 
 In 2010, Congress passed a law specifically designed to solve 
the problem of excessive delay but, the way the SEC has read the 
law—which has been acquiesced in by the courts and ignored by 
subsequent Congresses—has rendered it toothless and essentially 
meaningless. This has been accomplished, first, by the Commis-
sion’s cabined interpretation of the purpose of the law and its flawed 
review of supposed Supreme Court precedent, and then by the lower 
courts’ overly strong deference to this administrative agency’s 
reading of a law designed to curb its penchant for excessive delay. 
 Even though the problem of excessive delay remains un-
solved and unchanged, there has been no serious published anal-
ysis of the 2010 law or of the courts’ (or of the SEC’s) reading of that 
law. The purposes of this Article are first, to attempt to quantify 
the problem of excessive delay; and second, to explore, in more 
depth than it appears has ever been assayed, both the 2010 law 
and the court decisions that have considered it, to the end of de-
termining whether new life can properly be breathed into this 
                                                                                                             
* Richard E. Brodsky is an attorney in private practice in Coral Gables, Florida. 
Formerly an attorney with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Division of Enforcement, he has represented clients in Commission investiga-
tions and proceedings since 1981. The views he expresses in this Article are his 
own and not of any client or other person. Thanks are offered to Professor 
Andrew N. Vollmer for providing very thoughtful and helpful suggestions, 
but errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the author. 
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law. I conclude that the 2010 law, while hardly a model of ideal 
statutory craftsmanship, should be viewed as an actual deadline, 
akin to a statute of limitations. Or, Congress should revisit the issue 
of unnecessary delay and enact a clearer and more meaningful 
legislative solution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Few would question that “an effective enforcement pro-
gram” on the part of the Securities and Exchange Commission “is 
necessary to maintain investor confidence in the integrity, fair-
ness, and efficiency of our securities markets.”1 There is, though, 
a valid question whether a fair and effective enforcement program2 
can coexist with excessive delay in the process. And there is no 
question that SEC enforcement is and has long been dogged by 
excessive delay.3 
 I talk of “excessive delay,” not delay per se. Obviously, it takes 
time for the SEC Staff to conclude an investigation and decide 
whether to drop the matter or recommend that the Commission 
authorize an enforcement action, and for the Commission to con-
sider and act on that recommendation. Indeed, given the SEC’s 
status and the enormous power it wields,4 it would be highly 
inappropriate for the Commission to proceed on the premise that 
investigative speed is the sole or even the only important measure 
                                                                                                             
1 Securities Litigation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. 
& Fin. of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 173rd Cong. 237 (1994) (statement 
of Mark J. Griffin, Dir., Div. of Sec., Utah Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter 
Hearing].  
2 There are many books, treatises, law review articles, study materials 
and web sites exploring all aspects of SEC enforcement. Readers of this Arti-
cle must look elsewhere for a comprehensive understanding of that process. 
One very valuable—though somewhat outdated, because of intervening changes in 
the law—source among many is William R. McLucas et al., A Practitioner’s 
Guide to the SEC’s Investigative and Enforcement Process, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 53 
(1997). Another useful source is the SEC & EX. COMM’N DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, 
OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 4–5 (2017), https://www.sec.gov 
/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/J95Z-258G]. For 
purposes of this Article, the reader merely needs to know that: SEC investigations 
are commenced and conducted by staff members of the Division of Enforcement, 
whether resident in the Home Office or in one or more of the Commission’s 
eleven regional offices; when they finish investigations, the SEC Staff may, 
but need not, give prospective targets of an enforcement action notice of the 
likely charges (called, for reasons discussed in this Article, a “Wells notice”); 
and no enforcement action alleging a violation of the federal securities laws 
may be filed without authorization by the Commission, consisting of a maxi-
mum of 5 members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
3 See generally Hearing, supra note 1, at 199–200 (statement of Michael J. 
Cook). 
4 As the SEC puts it in its Canon of Ethics, “[t]he power to investigate car-
ries with it the power to defame and destroy.” 17 C.F.R. § 200.66 (1963). 
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of the quality of its enforcement efforts: investigative due care 
and effective supervision are equally or more important in order to 
distinguish between those who are properly named in an SEC en-
forcement action and those who are not. The issue is finding the 
proper balance between unduly dragging things out and rushing 
to a premature enforcement action. 
 This not a new problem. Excessive delay has long been iden-
tified as a problem at the SEC but, until 2010, had never been seri-
ously addressed by Congress or the courts other than through a 
generally applicable statute of limitations on certain types of relief 
(fines, penalties, and forfeitures).5 Finally, in 2010, Congress, as 
part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act,6 enacted a provision explicitly aimed at speeding up the 
enforcement process by adding Section 4E (“Deadline for Complet-
ing Examinations, Inspections and Enforcement Actions”) to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.7 Section 4E(a)(1) states: 
Not later than 180 days after the date on which [Securities and 
Exchange] Commission staff provide a written Wells notifica-
tion to any person, the Commission staff shall either file an 
action against such person or provide notice to the Director of 
the Division of Enforcement of its intent to not file an action.8  
Section 4E(a)(2) allows for extensions of the 180-day dead-
line.9 It is obvious from even a cursory reading of section 4E(a) that 
                                                                                                             
5 See, e.g., SEC, Office of Inspector Gen., Failure to Timely Investigate Al-
legations of Financial Fraud 1, 4 (2010); Marcy Gordon, SEC Official Pressed 
on 12-Year Delay to Ponzi Case, NEWSDAY (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.newsday 
.com/business/sec-official-pressed-on-12-year-delay-to-ponzi-case.  
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 4E, 124 Stat. 1867 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of various of 
the acts constituting the federal securities laws). 
7 Id. § 4E(a)(1). 
8 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5(a)(1) (2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5(b); § 4E(a)(1) 
(containing parallel provisions for SEC compliance examinations and inspec-
tions of regulated entities such as broker-dealers). Section 4E(b) is outside the 
scope of this Article. 
9 Section 4E(a)(2) provides: 
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if the Director of the Division 
of Enforcement of the Commission or the Director's designee de-
termines that a particular enforcement investigation is suffi-
ciently complex such that a determination regarding the filing 
of an action against a person cannot be completed within the 
deadline specified in paragraph (1), the Director of the Division 
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it is a somewhat oddly worded statute. For one thing, it appears 
to apply only when the Staff provides a written Wells notifica-
tion, and says nothing about any deadlines applicable to situations 
where the Staff chooses not to provide a Wells notice or where a 
Wells notice occurs after an intolerably long investigation.10 
Second, it speaks about the Staff’s filing an action, when, in fact, 
the SEC as an agency files an action and only after a majority of 
the Commissioners authorize a case.11 Third, it contains no re-
quirement that the Staff actually close an investigation for which 
they do not intend to file an action.12 None of these apparent 
oddities has been mentioned by the SEC or the courts in inter-
preting section 4E.13 
 The deadline established in section 4E(a)(1) has demon-
strated no practical effect.14 The SEC has done its best to ignore or 
enfeeble the deadline contained in section 4E(a)(1) by interpret-
ing it as an “internal-timing directive, designed to compel [the 
SEC] staff to complete investigations, examinations, and inspec-
tions in a timely manner and not ... a statute of limitations.”15 In 
other words, according to the SEC the deadline is a mere guideline 
                                                                                                             
of Enforcement of the Commission or the Director’s designee may, 
after providing notice to the Chairman of the Commission, ex-
tend such deadline as needed for one additional 180-day period. 
If after the additional 180-day period the Director of the Divi-
sion of Enforcement of the Commission or the Director’s de-
signee determines that a particular enforcement investigation 
is sufficiently complex such that a determination regarding the 
filing of an action against a person cannot be completed with-
in the additional 180-day period, the Director of the Division 
of Enforcement of the Commission or the Director's designee may, 
after providing notice to and receiving approval of the Com-
mission, extend such deadline as needed for one or more addi-
tional successive 180-day periods. 
§ 4E(a)(2) (emphases added). 
10 In fact, it is well known that, almost universally, Wells notices are provided, 
so this oddity has less significance than meets the eye. E.g., McLucas et al., 
supra note 2, at 113–14. 
11 See id. at 56, 58. 
12 See id. at 57, 111. 
13 See generally § 4E, 124 Stat. at 1867. 
14 See id. 
15 In re Montford & Co., Inv. Advisors Act Release No. 3829, 108 SEC Docket 
3763 (May 2, 2014) (affirming In re Montford & Company, Inc., Admin. Proc. 
No. 3-14536, 2012 WL 1377372 (ALJ Apr. 20, 2012) (initial decision). 
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of sorts, while providing no rights to those negatively affected by 
its violation.16 And, in the only appellate decision interpreting 
section 4E, the SEC’s interpretation was upheld by the D.C. 
Circuit in Montford & Co., Inc. v. SEC,17 in which, purporting to 
follow Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,18 the court overtly deferred to the SEC for its reading of this 
provision.19 A few district courts, all preceding the D.C. Circuit’s 
Montford decision, have also ruled that section 4E is not a stat-
ute of limitations.20 
 Neither the statute itself nor any of the judicial opinions 
interpreting it has been the subject of any academic analysis, and 
the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the meaning and effect of section 
4E has never been discussed in any published opinion, officially 
or unofficially reported. Perhaps this reflects fewer attempts to 
point to section 4E in defending SEC enforcement actions. Or per-
haps defense lawyers have viewed the pursuit of this issue a 
waste of time. For whatever reason that this issue is off the radar, 
there is a definite need to conduct a fresh review of the meaning 
and effect of section 4E. This is because this provision was obvi-
ously aimed at solving the problem of excessive delay but, years 
after the enactment of section 4E, that problem still infects the 
SEC enforcement process and has so far defied resolution. 
 In Part I of this Article, I discuss the problem of excessive 
delay in SEC enforcement and trace previous efforts to identify 
the problem and propose remedies.21 In Part II, I discuss the 
various cases that have interpreted section 4E, principally the 
Montford/SEC and Montford decisions, and explore in depths 
                                                                                                             
16 See id. 
17 793 F.3d 76, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (deferring to SEC’s “reasonable” inter-
pretation of section 4E). In this Article, the SEC ALJ’s Initial Decision is 
referred to as “Montford/ALJ,” the SEC’s Opinion in Montford & Co., Inc. as 
“Montford/SEC,” and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Montford and Co., Inc. v. 
SEC as “Montford.” 
18 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984). 
19 Montford, 793 F.3d at 81. 
20 See SEC v. NIR Grp., LLC, No. CV 11-4723, 2013 WL 5288962, at *1, *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2013); SEC v. Levin, No. 12-21917-CIV, 2013 WL 594736 
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013); Memorandum, SEC v. Scammell, No. CV 11-6597 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), ECF No. 13. None of these cases plowed new ground and 
therefore I do not separately analyze them. 
21 See infra Part I. 
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the cases on which the SEC’s Opinion and that of the D.C. Cir-
cuit relied.22 In Part III, I consider whether Montford appears to 
have been decided correctly.23 I conclude that there is substan-
tial reason to believe that it was not. In Part IV, I describe why 
there should be life in section 4E, at least until the SEC itself 
changes its view of the meaning and effect of this statutory pro-
vision, Congress enacts a more explicit statute, or courts see the 
issue differently than they have so far.24 
I.THE CONTINUING AND WORSENING PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE 
 DELAY IN THE SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 
A.The Scope of the Problem 
 The problem of excessive delay in SEC enforcement and the 
negative effects it causes investigatees and the public interest 
(as embodied in a fair and effective SEC enforcement program) 
are well established.25 In fact, years after Dodd-Frank, the limited 
data made public by the Commission make it clear that the situa-
tion is getting much worse.26 
 According to the latest annual data published by the SEC,27 
the average length of those investigations that led to an en-
forcement action—measured from commencement of the investi-
gation to bringing an enforcement action—is now 25 months, a 19 
percent increase since 2013,28 while the number of enforcement 
                                                                                                             
22 See infra Part II. 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Off. of Inspector Gen. at 16, 17, 34. 
26 See In re Montford & Co. at 3768, 3771; see also SEC, Fiscal Year 2020 
Congressional Budget Justification Annual Performance Plan 123, 124 
(2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/secfy20congbudgjust_0.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/N583-JDAB]. 
27 One commentator, based on a review of fifteen years of SEC enforce-
ment actions, has characterized the SEC’s published enforcement “metrics 
[as] deeply flawed,” finding “that the widely-circulated statistics are invalid 
because they do not measure what they purport to measure, and unreliable 
because they are inconsistent and can be manipulated all too easily.” Urska 
Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC's Enforcement 
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 901 (2016). Nevertheless, in her article 
Professor Velikonja does not mention the statistics discussed below in n. 28.  
28 Every year, the SEC reports to the Congress both “the average number 
of months between the opening of an investigation and the filing of the first 
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actions that are brought within 2 years of the opening of an in-
vestigation has dropped 22 percent since 2014.29 Every year, the 
Commission admits that this length of time is too long: “Target: 
                                                                                                             
enforcement action arising out of that investigation” and “the rate at which 
the first enforcement action arising out of an investigation was filed within 
two years of the opening of the investigation.” The data show that, for what-
ever reason—complexity of cases, loss of manpower, or simple inadequacy of 
performance—the length of SEC investigations has grown from twenty-one or 
twenty-two months to twenty-five months in this decade: 
 
Fiscal Year Average Number Months Percent Within 2 Years 
2007 N/A 54 
2008 N/A 62 
2009 N/A 70 
2010 N/A 67 
2011 22 61 
2012 21 63 
2013 21 58 
2014 21 64 
2015 24 58 
2016 24 53 
2017 24 52 
2018 25 49 
 
SEC, Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget Justification Annual Perfor-
mance Plan 123, 124 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/secfy20congbudgjust_0 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/N583-JDAB]; SEC, Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional 
Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 109, 110 (2018), https://www 
.sec.gov/reports-and-publications/budget-reports/secfy19congbudgjust [https:// 
perma.cc/42Q2-WB5M]; SEC, Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional Budget Justifi-
cation Annual Performance Plan 35–36 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/reports 
-and-publications/budget-reports/secfy18congbudgjust [https://perma.cc/DQY2-KY 
3A]; SEC, Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Budget Justification & Annual Per-
formance Plan 37–38 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudg 
just.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARB3-296Z] [hereinafter SEC, 2017 APR]; SEC, 
Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 
33 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/PDW2-WJJC]. 
For further comparison, the data for the first metric (percentage of inves-
tigations yielding enforcement proceedings within 2 years) from FY 2003 and 
FY 2004 were 63 percent and 69 percent, respectively, markedly higher than 
the recent trend. SEC, 2004 Performance and Accountability Report 57, 59 
(2005), https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar04.pdf#sec2 [https://perma.cc 
/MWK6-HJMP]. Data for the second metric, elapsed time to commencement of 
enforcement action, were not published in the 2004 report. 
29 See id. 
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Not Met,” according to the Commission’s Annual Performance 
Reviews covering 2012 through 2018.30 
 What is more, the published data do not cover the time it 
takes for the Commission’s Staff to commence and close an in-
vestigation and notify an investigatee that no enforcement action 
will be taken.31 This kind of delay has great importance to those 
investigatees that stay under an enforcement cloud long after it 
is apparent to the relevant staff and parties that no enforcement 
case is in the offing.32 In response to an FOIA request by the author 
for “the most recently available data showing, or sufficient to derive, 
the average time it takes from the commencement of an investi-
gation to the actual closing of an investigation,” the Commission’s 
Office of FOIA Services has stated:  
According to the Division of Enforcement, the average time it 
takes from the commencement of an investigation to the ac-
tual closing of an investigation is 863 days. Please be advised 
that if the enforcement matter originated as a matter under 
inquiry (MUI) before it was administratively converted into 
an investigation, this duration of time was included in the 
calculation.33  
                                                                                                             
30 See Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget Justification Annual Per-
formance Plan 123–24; Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification 
Annual Performance Plan 109–10; Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional Budget 
Justification Annual Performance Plan 35–36; Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional 
Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 37–38; Fiscal Year 2014 
Congressional Budget Justification & Annual Performance Plan 31, 33; see 
also SEC, Fiscal Year 2016 Congressional Budget Justification & Annual Per-
formance Plan 39–40 (2015); SEC, 2015 Fiscal Year Congressional Budget 
Justification & Annual Performance Plan 147, 149 (2014). 
31 Since 1972, the SEC has left to the Staff’s discretion whether to notify 
investigatees that the investigation has been closed. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) 
(2008). According to the SEC Enforcement Division’s Manual, it is the Staff’s 
“policy” to send termination letters to anyone that was named in the caption 
of a formal order of investigation, made a Wells submission, asks for a letter, 
or that reasonably believes the Staff was considering an enforcement recom-
mendation against them. Nevertheless, the Staff, upon approval by a senior 
Enforcement Division official, need not send a termination letter, and no 
standards for such a decision are provided. SEC, Enforcement Manual 27–28 
(2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/27GH-LQLQ]. 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 63–71. 
33 Letter, SEC Office of FOIA Services to author, June 4, 2019 (in posses-
sion of author). 
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In other words, the average investigation that does not result in 
enforcement action lasts over two years and four months. 
B.Recognition of the Problem over the Years 
 SEC investigations are non-public, and because the SEC, 
generally, has had no interest in airing its dirty laundry,34 the 
details of most instances of excessive delay are known only to 
the SEC, investigatees and their counsel.35 Nevertheless, it has 
been possible to locate through an intensive search on the Inter-
net enough information to develop a reasonably reliable grasp 
on the extent to which the issue has long been recognized, criti-
cized, and analyzed, particularly from the vantage point of those 
outside of the agency.36 
                                                                                                             
34 “Although the SEC has previously conducted internal reviews of its en-
forcement activities, results have not always been made available to the 
public.” Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from 
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 681 n.7 (2012) (citing 
Judith Burns, SEC’s Enforcement Division Receives High Marks for Speedup 
in Past Year, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1999, at B9). For example, the SEC con-
ducted an internal review of its enforcement division in 1998, led by then-
Commissioner Laura Unger, but the results were not made public. Id. It was 
reported, however, that the review identified delays in bringing new cases 
and completing existing ones. Id. And, several years later, in an interview, 
Ms. Unger said that the study focused heavily on the time it took to complete 
investigations. See infra text accompanying notes 51–53. 
35 Occasionally, however, examples of excessive delay are documented in 
reports of the SEC’s Office of Inspector General. See, e.g., Off. of Inspector 
Gen., Failure to Timely Investigate Allegations of Financial Fraud at 16–17, 
33–34 (detailing SEC Staff’s failure to investigate twenty complaints, over 
thirty-three months, received from one registered representative (stockbroker) 
concerning alleged fraud in sale of a public company’s assets, followed by Staff 
decision not to investigate because the complaint was stale), https://www.sec 
.gov/files/oig-505.pdf [http://perma.cc/FX3J-AEPZ]; see also SEC, Report of In-
vestigation, Failure to Vigorously Enforce Action Against W. Holding and 
Bear Stearns at the Miami Regional Office, Case No. OIG-483, 5, 24, 26 
(2008) (detailing separate seven and eight-month delays where nothing oc-
curred in investigation of Bear Stearns’ alleged fraudulent conduct, followed 
by decision to close investigation even after settlement offer of $500,000), 
http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/sec-oig-report-20080930-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9 
XA-9BSM]. 
36 See generally id. 
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 A 1956 memorandum from the Commission’s Division of 
Corporation Finance highlighted the issue:  
Don’t let cases drag. Keep close control over your cases and let 
your superior know when a case is not proceeding properly, 
either because of the conduct of the registrant or its repre-
sentatives or because of internal problems here. Non-action on a 
case or problem is the cause of most of the criticism we hear of 
the Division and Commission with respect to matters within 
our jurisdiction.37 
In January 1972, Chairman William J. Casey, with the 
concurrence of the other members of the SEC, appointed The 
Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices (better 
known by the last name of its Chairman, New York attorney John 
A. Wells) “to review and evaluate the Commission’s enforcement 
policies and practices,” and to make appropriate recommenda-
tions.38 The Committee issued a report in June 1972, with 43 
                                                                                                             
37 Memorandum from Byron D. Whiteside on Division Operations and Op-
erating Procedure to All Supervisory Personnel 2 (Sept. 4, 1956), http://3197 
d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/col 
lection/papers/1950/1956_0904_WoodsideOperationsT.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q 
MR-JP69] (emphasis added). This memorandum, although from the Division of 
Corporation Finance, which has responsibility for processing and commenting 
on SEC filings, such as registration statements, proxy statements, and peri-
odic reports, is pertinent because through August 1972 the Commission’s en-
forcement responsibilities were carried out within each operating division, 
such as “Corp Fin,” rather than being centralized in an Enforcement Division. 
See generally SEC, ABOUT THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, https://www.sec 
.gov/enforce/Article/enforce-about.html [https://perma.cc/YL57-W4VB]. 
The Whiteside memorandum is one of thousands of documents preserved 
on the website, http://www.sechistorical.org, of the SEC Historical Society, a 
private, not-for-profit entity. I express my profound appreciation to its found-
ers and supporters, who have had the foresight to collect and publish on its 
website thousands of SEC documents—like the Whiteside memorandum—
that otherwise would be unavailable on the Internet. 
38 John A. Wells et al., Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement 
Policies and Practices 1 (1972), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/papers 
/1970/page-3.php (published in 3 parts in pdf format). The Report is referred 
to in this Article as the “Wells Report.” Messrs. Cohen and Demmler were 
former SEC Chairmen and private practitioners and Mr. Wells was a promi-
nent corporate lawyer. On a point of personal privilege, I had the occasion to 
face “Manny” Cohen across the table when he was in private practice and I 
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recommendations.39 In September the Commission accepted the 
most famous recommendation, no. 16 (calling for regularizing 
practice of permitting potential respondents or defendants to make 
a written submission)40 in substantial part.41 This led to the so-
called “Wells Process,” which is specifically referred to in Exchange 
Act section 4E(a)(1).42 For the purposes of this Article, however, 
another recommendation, no. 11, is of more moment. 
 Aimed at various problems discussed in the Committee’s 
Report, including investigations that were “too protracted”,43 this 
recommendation was that: 
[a] procedure should be established for auditing the investiga-
tive practices and techniques of enforcement personnel on a 
continuing basis; to that end the Commission should designate 
an official, who would perform a “staff” as distinguished from 
a “line” function and be responsible directly to the Commission, 
whose function would be, on a post-audit basis, to determine 
whether the Commission’s policy of fairness, promptness, and 
efficiency in investigative procedures is being observed.44 
Significantly, among the “work assignments” suggested by the 
Committee for this proposed official were “inquiries into the rea-
sons for protracted investigations.”45 Nothing came of this par-
ticular recommendation—presumably, much to the relief of the 
                                                                                                             
was with the SEC Enforcement Division in the 1970s. Manny was not only 
the consummate gentleman, but he had a profound ability to find the “sweet 
spot” to resolve an investigation—the point at which both the Staff and he 
could justifiably conclude that a fair resolution had been achieved. 
39 Id., passim. Each recommendation was stated in the introduction to the 
Wells Report and was repeated—not necessarily word-for-word—and discussed 
in the body of the report. Quoted recommendations herein are as stated in the 
introduction to the Report. 
40 Id., at iv, ¶ 16. 
41 SEC, Procedures Relating to the Commencement of Enforcement Pro-
ceedings & Termination of Staff Investigations 1 (1972), https://www.sec.gov 
/divisions/enforce/wells-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/GFG7-98AV] (codified at 
17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c), part of the SEC’s Rules on Informal and Other Procedures). 
None of the other recommendations was discussed in Release No. 5310. 
42 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection  Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 4E(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1867 (2010). 
43 Wells et al., supra note 38, at v, ¶¶ 22–23. 
44 Id., at iii ¶ 11 (emphasis added). 
45 Id. at 25. 
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SEC Staff46—but the problem of too protracted investigations did 
not disappear, and has remained unsolved to this day.47 
 In 1985, an American Bar Association task force recom-
mended revisions to the SEC enforcement process, including 
limiting SEC Orders of Investigation (the document authorizing 
the conduct of a specific investigation and endowing the Staff 
with subpoena power) to one year.48 This was an obvious refer-
ence to the troubling length of investigations. Nothing came of 
this recommendation.49 
 In 1998, the SEC conducted an internal review of its en-
forcement division, led by then-Commissioner Laura Unger.50 
Although the results were not made public, it was contempora-
neously reported that the review identified delays in bringing 
new cases and completing existing ones.51 According to an inter-
view Ms. Unger gave years later, the review focused on En-
forcement operations and, in particular, “why investigations take 
too long; people not knowing when an investigation’s over, and 
other resource issues.”52 
 At the beginning of the 21st Century, new Chairman Harvey 
L. Pitt53 pressed for a policy of “real-time enforcement” to improve 
                                                                                                             
46 It is apparent that the Staff opposed many of the Wells Committee rec-
ommendations. See Paul S. Atkins, Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: 
A Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 
13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 381 (2008) (citing Harvey L. Pitt et al., 
SEC Enforcement Process, Internationalization of the Securities Markets—
Business Trends and Regulatory Policy, C489 ALI-ABA, 63 (1989)). While rec-
ommendation no. 11 was ignored by the Commission, the later creation of the 
Office of Inspector General has resulted in the airing of Staff missteps by an 
at least nominally neutral observer. 
47 Id. See also Daniel Hawke, 5 Common Misconceptions About SEC Inves-
tigations, Law360 (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/-/media/files 
/perspectives/publications/2018/11/5-common-misconceptions-about-sec-inves 
tigations.pdf [http://perma.cc/79D8-MZHA]. 
48 See Marc I. Steinberg, Emerging Capital Markets: Proposals and Rec-
ommendations for Implementation, 30 INT’L LAW. 715, 718, 720 (1996). 
49 See generally id. 
50 See Interview by Kenneth Durr with Laura Unger, SEC Historical Soci-
ety, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2005), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c 
016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oral-histories/unger11 
0705Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LCU-KZA5] [hereinafter Unger Interview]. 
51 See Burns, supra note 34. 
52 Unger Interview, supra note 50.  
53 Few, if any, Chairmen, before or since, have brought to his or her tenure 
the breadth of experience and detailed knowledge of the intricacies of this 
 
2020] SECTION 4E: TOOTHLESS OR NOT 337 
on a situation where “enforcement action often resulted many 
years after actual wrongdoing had occurred, and often after the 
fruits of such frauds had long been squandered.”54 A few high-
visibility cases were brought very quickly, but, for the most part, 
the Enforcement process continued to grind away, slowly.55  
 In 2007, the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office took 
note that “Enforcement may leave open for years many investi-
gations that are not being actively pursued with potentially 
negative consequences for individuals and companies no longer 
under review.”56 The GAO reported: “Enforcement officials cited 
several reasons for division attorneys not always closing investi-
gations promptly. In particular, the officials said that Enforce-
ment attorneys may view pursing potential securities violations 
as the division’s highest priority and lack sufficient time, admin-
istrative support, and incentives to comply with established ad-
ministrative procedures for closing investigations.”57 The GAO 
also took note of a new SEC Enforcement effort (as of June 2007) 
to speed up case closings.58 There has been no discernible long-
term improvement.59 
 Unreasonable delays even had a role in the SEC Staff’s 
inability to discover, despite numerous examinations and en-
forcement inquiries, the Madoff fraud.60 In one such instance, 
                                                                                                             
agency that Harvey Pitt brought. He had had an extremely successful career 
in private practice, before which he had been SEC General Counsel, among 
other leadership posts he held at the Commission. Since he left the SEC in 
2003 he has continued his outstanding career in the private sector. Harvey L. 
Pitt, SEC Historical Society, SEC Chairmen’s Roundtable Submission 4 
(2004), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81 
.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/2000/2004_0602_SECHS_RT_Ch_Pitt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2E4B-M2HK]. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-830, SEC: ADDITIONAL 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESS LIMITATIONS 
IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OPERATIONS 21 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets 
/270/265419.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAN6-6J3Z]. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 22. 
59 See id. 
60 See SEC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE 
OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 23, 29, 32 (2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8AQ-GCVB]. 
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someone waited two weeks to open a MUI (matter under in-
quiry) for the latest Madoff enforcement inquiry, as a result of 
which a tip from a suspicious former Madoff investor was not 
followed up because the recipients of the tip did not know that 
there was an active inquiry under way.61 
C.The Causes and Effects of Excessive Delay 
 If it appears to be a commonly held opinion among attor-
neys things are too slow in the world of SEC enforcement, what 
are the causes of excessive delay? Based on my forty-four years 
of experience on both sides of the Enforcement table, it is too 
easy an answer to say that SEC investigations are highly com-
plex, manpower is limited, etc. The fact is that, based on my 
experience, the bulk of SEC investigations are not exceptionally 
complex and do not involve huge numbers of documents and wit-
nesses, but, even if it were so, complexity is not likely the prime 
or even a significant cause of excessive delay. 
 In any one investigation, the active conduct of the investi-
gation (subpoenaing and reviewing documents and taking sworn 
testimony of witnesses) often takes substantially less time than the 
processing of the Staff’s recommendations to either take enforce-
ment action or close the investigation without action. Substan-
tial amounts of time typically pass after the Staff has finished 
the active investigation, after which time is taken up, typically, 
by the Staff’s providing Wells notifications and receiving Wells 
submissions; by the drafting of an “action memorandum” rec-
ommending an enforcement action (or, in the alternative, a clos-
ing memorandum); by the review of such memoranda at various 
levels of the Division of Enforcement; and by the Staff’s sending 
an action memorandum to other interested divisions or offices 
within the SEC for their review and comment. (Of course, for the 
purposes of section 4E, the only time period that counts is measured 
from the date of a written Wells notification or the period of any 
extension.) These reviews are important and vital processes,62 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. at 262–68. 
62 The review process is a vital part of a fair and effective SEC enforcement 
program, but, for cases that are actually litigated, it is not at all uncommon for 
the SEC to be unable to prove at trial what it alleged in its complaint despite 
its ability to obtain sworn pre-filing testimony from all possible witnesses. 
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which, if performed with dispatch and care, certainly do not exces-
sively delay the enforcement process, and are designed to lead to 
fair results. While precise measurements are not possible on the 
basis of publicly available data, experience suggests that there 
are other significant pockets of delay, including investigatees’ “slow-
walking” production of documents and Staff disinterestedness. 
 For his part, Professor Vollmer suggests that “[t]he main 
reason for prolonged investigations, especially since the Madoff 
affair, is the staff’s reluctance to close an investigation because 
                                                                                                             
See, e.g., SEC v. Schvacho, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2014), in 
which, after a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the defendant, 
noting “the overreaching, self-serving interpretation that the SEC imposed on 
the evidence presented at trial.” 
A reasonable inference from a failure to prove what is alleged is that what 
was alleged was not actually supported by the investigative record. Unfortu-
nately, such a situation is far from unheard of at the SEC. See Andrew N. 
Vollmer, Four Ways to Improve SEC Enforcement, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 1 (2015) 
(“[One of t]he three fundamental problems with SEC enforcement [is] that 
the Commission and the Division of Enforcement misunderstand or mischar-
acterize the factual record”). This stems from either the lack of, or inadequate, 
supervisory review of the actual basis for factual assertions in a Staff action 
memorandum. Professor Vollmer is a former SEC Deputy General Counsel 
and an experienced SEC practitioner in private practice, and his article is a 
valuable and insightful overview of what is wrong with SEC enforcement. 
Notably, his article also focuses on the need to shorten SEC investigations:  
Extended investigations disserve the enforcement process and 
the persons being investigated. The delays increase the costs 
of defense and the burdens on private parties. Lengthy inves-
tigations create uncertainty for both companies and individuals, 
and uncertainty about the SEC's plans can harm reputations, 
stall careers, and postpone financings and investments, research, 
and product development.  
Id. In the author’s experience, it is not at all rare for the Staff members con-
ducting the investigation to misstate the evidence (not necessarily in bad 
faith—sometimes, instead, through inattention) in advancing a case towards 
Commission consideration. The solution is simple: careful review of underly-
ing evidence by supervisory staff members. It is unclear, however, how inten-
sive such review is, if it occurs at all. See Richard E. Brodsky, Commentary: 
Report inadvertently opens window into SEC’s operations, MIAMI DAILY BUS. 
REV. (2008) (“Staff investigators’ reports on the results of investigations are 
often not reviewed carefully to make sure that the facts are as they are por-
trayed or supported by sufficient evidence, with the result that critical deci-
sions affecting people’s lives can be made on the basis of mistaken, or even 
false, assumptions or inadequate evidence”). 
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of a fear of overlooking a serious issue or of being criticized for 
failing to enforce the securities laws vigorously.”63 That may be 
the case since the Madoff fraud exploded in December 2008, but 
the problem of excessive delay plagued the Commission for dec-
ades before then, so unless fear of missing things has been the 
main problem all along, it is not realistic to view it as the “main” 
cause today.64 Ultimately, excessive delay is a management prob-
lem.65 Until career success at the management level is no longer 
defined by the simple metric of the number of cases a staff attor-
ney’s work has resulted in an enforcement action being brought, it 
will continue to defy solution.66 
 Whatever its causes, the adverse effects of excessive delay 
are real.67 Excessive delay harms investigatees when the SEC 
Staff leaves an investigation open long after it should be obvious 
that an enforcement action is not a realistic outcome.68 As ob-
served by the 1972 Wells Committee, “investigations are often 
protracted and their existence frequently becomes a matter of public 
knowledge. During the pendency of an investigation uncertain-
ties are likely to be created in the minds of the investigatees and 
those with whom they have business or other dealings.”69 One 
court, although ruling that section 4E did not act as a limita-
tions provision, nevertheless recognized that, “[i]n enacting the 
deadline, Congress obviously recognized the seriousness of a 
long-pending unresolved SEC investigation, a concern that would 
be exacerbated where the targets might include a public company 
                                                                                                             
63 Vollmer, supra note 62. 
64 Id. at 7. 
65 Id. at 5. 
66 Id. at 6. 
67 Professor Vollmer regards the need to shorten investigations as one of 
the four basic problems with SEC enforcement: 
Extended investigations disserve the enforcement process and 
the persons being investigated. The delays increase the costs 
of defense and the burdens on private parties. Lengthy inves-
tigations create uncertainty for both companies and individuals, 
and uncertainty about the SEC’s plans can harm reputations, 
stall careers, and postpone financings and investments, research, 
and product development. 
Vollmer, supra note 62, at 7. 
68 Id. at 7. 
69 Wells et al., supra note 38, at 20. 
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or its officers and directors subject to disclosure requirements.”70 
Thus, many public companies will disclose receipt of a Wells 
notification,71 and, depending on the specific information requested, 
broker-dealers and investment and municipal advisors may be 
required to disclose pending investigations in response to a re-
quest for proposal (RFP) from a municipal entity or other poten-
tial issuer.72 Finally, if a case sits long enough on SEC desks, 
virtual or real, there can develop intense pressure on the part of 
a party under investigation to agree to settle the case just to be free 
of its overhang.73 In sum, the longer a case destined for closure 
remains open, the greater the damage done to those investigatees 
that, in the end, will not be named in an enforcement action. 
 The adverse effects of excessive delay are also felt by the 
Commission and the public in the depreciation of the deterrent 
effect of prompt enforcement action—the SEC publicly states 
that “[w]hile timeliness in filing actions can be influenced by a 
number of factors, it is important because it can enhance the 
action’s deterrent impact”74—as well as uninformed markets hav-
ing to trade on misinformation not uncovered by prompt expo-
sure by the SEC.75 In addition, when excessive delay occurs, 
                                                                                                             
70 SEC v. NIR Grp., LLC, No. CV 11-4723 JFB GRB, 2013 WL 5288962, at 
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2013). 
71 Deborah S. Birnbach, Do You Have to Disclose a Government Investiga-
tion?, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation (Apr. 9, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04/09/do-you 
-have-to-disclose-a-government-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/VNN4-YB9W]. 
72 E.g., Chicago, Ill. Park District, Request for Proposal (RFP) for Inde-
pendent Registered Municipal Advisor (IRMA) Services 13 (Apr. 30, 2018),  
https://assets.chicagoparkdistrict.com/s3fs-public/documents/page/Request%20 
For%20Prposal%20-RFP-%20for%20Independent%20Registered%20Municipal 
%20Advisor%20-IRMA-%20Services%20%204.30.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMW3 
-MG5Q] (“List any pending investigation of the firm or enforcement or disci-
plinary action, administrative proceeding, malpractice claim or other like pro-
ceeding by the SEC, MSRB or other federal, state or local regulatory body 
against your firm or any of its personnel relating to your firm’s services as 
financial advisor current, pending, or occurring in the past three (3) years.”). 
73 Vollmer, supra note 62, at 3. 
74 E.g., SEC, 2017 APR, supra note 28, at 109. 
75 The negative effect on the deterrent value of taking too long to bring an 
enforcement action was one of the cornerstones of SEC Chairman Pitt’s “real-
time enforcement” initiative. See Pitt, supra note 53, at 4. 
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cases get stale, memories fade, and justice suffers, so both sides 
in an adjudicated case can suffer from the effects of delay.76 
II.THE MONTFORD DECISIONS 
 Congress enacted section 4A into law in 2010,77 but it has 
been treated both by the Commission and the courts as an essen-
tially meaningless law.78 The key decision is Montford. In this 
section, I analyze the decision, starting with the Initial Decision 
of the SEC Administrative Law Judge, proceeding to the Com-
mission’s Opinion, and, finally, the decision of the D.C. Circuit. I 
find substantial issues with which to disagree at all three levels. 
A.Proceedings at the SEC 
 Montford involved a registered investment adviser that 
allegedly misled its clients into believing that it was wholly in-
dependent when, in fact, it received kickbacks from an institu-
tion with which it urged its clients to invest.79 The Commission 
instituted an administrative enforcement proceeding, under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,80 187 days after the Staff pro-
vided a Wells notification to the adviser and its principal.81 After 
an evidentiary hearing, the SEC administrative law judge (ALJ) 
found the adviser and its principal liable for fraud and other 
violations and imposed penalties and other sanctions, which 
findings were affirmed by the Commission and the D.C. Cir-
cuit.82 The respondents raised a defense that the proceeding was 
barred because the Staff missed the deadline under section 4E 
and the deadline was not properly extended, and separately 
moved to dismiss on the same grounds.83 The ALJ rejected these 
                                                                                                             
76 Vollmer, supra note 62, at 8. 
77 SEC, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, https://www.sec 
.gov/answers/about-laws.html [https://perma.cc/DJQ8-AU9R].  
78 Vollmer, supra note 62, at 7. 
79 In re Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors Act Release 
No. 3829, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3779 (May 2, 2014), affirming In re Mont-
ford & Co. (Montford/ALJ), Admin. Proc. No. 3-14536, 2012 WL 1377372 
(Apr. 20, 2012). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1ff (2005). 
81 Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
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defenses.84 She found that the Enforcement Director had extended 
the 180-day deadline, and—according to the Commission’s order 
denying the respondents’ request for an interlocutory order—
“implicitly found” that, in doing so, the Director had made the 
requisite “complexity determination.”85 
 On appeal from the initial decision, the SEC affirmed.86 
Regarding the alleged violation of section 4E, the SEC affirmed 
on different grounds than advanced by the ALJ.87 Obviously eager 
to rule on the underlying issue of the effect of missing the dead-
line, the Commission largely ignored that issue88 and focused 
almost entirely on its view that section 4E imposed no limita-
tions period. A summary of the SEC’s main points is as follows: 
Section 4E was enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, a stat-
ute that significantly expanded the Commission’s authority to 
police fraud in the securities industry. This particular provi-
sion was included under the section of the Dodd-Frank Act ti-
tled “Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies,” 
which Congress explained at the time “strengthens the SEC’s 
authority to conduct investigations.” Nowhere in Section 4E, 
or elsewhere in the Act, did Congress identify a consequence if 
Commission staff fails to comply with these deadlines. Section 
4E states in pertinent part only that, 180 days after providing 
a Wells notification, Division “staff shall either file ... or provide 
notice to the Director of the Division ... of its intent to not file 
an action.” Section 4E says nothing about dismissal or preclu-
sion of action if the deadline is missed; nor does it expressly 
afford the recipients of a Wells notification any rights.89 
 The Commission expanded its “statutory purpose” argu-
ment, stating that “[t]he only statute of limitations applicable to 
                                                                                                             
84 Id. 
85 Montford & Co., Order Denying Suggestion for Interlocutory Review, 
Advisers Act Rel. No. 3311, at 2 (Nov. 9, 2011). 
86 Montford, 793 F.3d at 80. 
87 Id. 
88 The Commission found no error in the ALJ’s finding that the Staff 
properly extended the 180-day deadline, but pointedly emphasized that “the 
basis for [the extension] is irrelevant to any claim or defense that Respondents 
can make here.” In re Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors 
Act Release No. 3829, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771 (May 2, 2014), affirming In 
re Montford & Co. (Montford/ALJ), Admin. Proc. No. 3-14536, 2012 WL 
1377372 (Apr. 20, 2012) (footnotes omitted). 
89 Id. 
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our proceedings is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2462,” and that “[i]n 
enacting section 4E, Congress said nothing about creating a new 
abbreviated statute of limitations, either as a replacement for or 
a supplement to 28 U.S.C. § 2462.”90 It added: 
Moreover, it would be inconsistent with Congress’s intent to in-
crease our authority to curb securities fraud under the Dodd-
Frank Act section enacting Section 4E to read the provision as 
limiting our ability to act in a proceeding that otherwise meets 
the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2462. This is particularly true 
where, as here, dismissal of the action would harm the investing 
public by foreclosing the Commission from taking appropriate 
remedial measures.91 
 The SEC also reasoned that, given that the Staff has the 
discretion, according to the SEC’s rules and judicial precedent, 
whether or not to provide a Wells notification, “[i]t would make 
little sense to conclude that the remedy for missing the 180-day 
deadline is dismissal when the Division could avoid this outcome 
by not issuing a Wells notification in the first place.”92 
 The Commission stated that its “interpretation” of section 
4E was consistent with pertinent Supreme Court precedent, citing 
Brock v. Pierce County93 and United States v. James Daniel Good 
Real Property94 Both of these cases dealt with the meaning of 
statutes “prescrib[ing] internal time periods for federal agency 
action without specifying any consequences for noncompliance.”95 
The Commission—incorrectly, in my view96—read both cases as 
having “held that congressional enactments that prescribe internal 
time periods for federal agency action without specifying any conse-
quences for noncompliance do not necessitate dismissal of the 
action if the agency does not act within the time prescribed.”97 
 Finally, the Commission concluded: 
Based on the text and legislative history of Section 4E and 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting similar statutes, we 
                                                                                                             
90 Id. 
91 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
92 Id. at 3772. 
93 476 U.S. 253 (1986). 
94 510 U.S. 43 (1993). 
95 Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771. 
96 See infra text accompanying notes 143–66. 
97 Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771–72. 
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find that this provision is intended to operate as an internal 
timing directive, designed to compel our staff to complete in-
vestigations, examinations, and inspections in a timely manner 
and not as a statute of limitations.98 
B.The D.C. Circuit Opinion 
1.Chevron 
 The respondents appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which, in 
reliance on Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,99 affirmed.100 To evaluate the D.C. Circuit’s Montford 
decision, however, one must engage in a slight detour: while a full 
analysis of Chevron and its progeny is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, there must be a review of at least the Chevron basics.101 
 Chevron involved a challenge by a public interest group to 
the validity of the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules, 
enacted under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, covering 
the regulation of “new or modified major stationary sources” of 
air pollution by states that had not attained air quality standards 
previously established by EPA.102 In its rules, EPA permitted 
those “non-attaining” states to allow individual plants to use the 
“bubble” approach—to group all individual new or modified “sta-
tionary sources” together, so that any one “source” could be in 
non-compliance so long as overall plant emissions did not exceed 
the standard.103 The D.C. Circuit found that the term “station-
ary sources” was not “explicitly defined” in the statute and that 
the legislative history was “contradictory,”104 so the court turned 
to “the purposes of the non-attainment program.”105 The court 
held that EPA’s use of the “bubble concept” in this regulation 
conflicted with earlier decisions of that Circuit holding that this 
                                                                                                             
98 Id. at 3772. 
99 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
100 793 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
101 467 U.S. at 837. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 839–40. 
104 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 
1982), rev’d sub nom. Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). 
105 Id. at 723 n.39. 
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concept was inapplicable to situations in which Congress intended 
to improve air quality and not just preserve the status quo.106 
 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that “[t]he basic 
legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial def-
inition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided that 
Congress itself had not commanded that definition.”107 He then 
proceeded to explain how the Court of Appeals should have de-
cided the case: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction 
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.108 
The Court further explained in a now-famous footnote:  
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory con-
struction and must reject administrative constructions which 
are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employ-
ing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that 
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that 
intention is the law and must be given effect.109 
                                                                                                             
106 Id. at 726. 
107 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
108 Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted). This is what is now called the Chevron 
“two-step analysis.” E.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 
2124 (2016) (applying Chevron to Department of Labor regulation establishing 
scope of exemption from overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act). 
Or, as some refer to it, the “Chevron Two-Step.” See Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2361 (2018); 
Jacob Crump, Corpus Linguistics in the Chevron Two-Step, 2018 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 399, 418 (2018). Not hailing from Texas and never having learned to 
dance the two-step, I refer to the Chevron Two-Step as “the Two Questions,” 
Step One as “Question 1,” and Step Two as “Question 2.” 
109 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). 
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 Despite the seeming clarity and simplicity of the Chevron 
opinion, the development of the law in the years since has led to 
extraordinary confusion and uncertainty concerning its meaning 
and application, with many Supreme Court opinions seemingly 
in conflict with one another.110 There is reasonable doubt even 
as to whether the standard of review that seems to have been 
mandated by Chevron differs in any material respect from that 
applied in traditional judicial review of agency decisions.111 Thus, 
under the Administrative Procedures Act, a reviewing court is to 
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law”.112 This is the same standard that the 
Court has said is to be applied to Chevron Question 2,113 leading 
Justice Kagan to state that the analysis under Chevron Question 2 
and the APA “would be the same.”114 
 Rather than join the fray about what Chevron “really” 
means or requires, I return to the Court’s opinion for the bedrock 
of its analysis. Chevron lays out certain “well-settled principles,” 
the avoidance of which it says caused “the Court of Appeals [to 
have] misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regu-
lations at issue.”115 One can only wonder why so many serious 
                                                                                                             
110 There is a plethora of scholarly articles discussing the problem of making 
intelligible sense of Chevron and its progeny. Professor Michael Kagan has noted: 
Since the early days of the doctrine, the trouble with Chevron 
has been in understanding why the Court does one thing in one 
case but another thing in another case. The problem is not just 
that the Court has sometimes explicitly indicated that there are 
exceptions to this doctrine—the so-called ‘Step Zero,’ for ex-
ample. Instead, the problem is that the Court far more fre-
quently fails to follow Chevron’s normal two-step analysis in cases 
to which it seems to apply and then does not explain why. 
Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decisions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 37, 39 (2018). 
111 Vollmer, supra note 62, at 3. 
112 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
113 See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 558 (2012) (de-
ferring under Question 2 because agency regulations were “neither arbitrary 
or capricious in substance, [n]or manifestly contrary to the statute”) (altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
114 See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) (“analysis” under 
section 706(2) and Chevron Question 2 “would be the same”). 
115 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
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analyses of Chevron do not start with, or even review, these 
“principles.”116 Only one Supreme Court decision, INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, does so.117  
 The Chevron “principles,” in full, are as follows: 
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congres-
sionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation 
of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly 
or explicitly, by Congress.’ If Congress has explicitly left a gap 
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority 
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling 
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation 
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than 
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency. 
 
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statu-
tory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of 
deference to administrative interpretations 
“has been consistently followed by this Court whenever 
decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has 
involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full un-
derstanding of the force of the statutory policy in the 
given situation has depended upon more than ordi-
nary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to 
agency regulations.” 
.... 
 
“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation 
of conflicting policies that were committed to the 
agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it 
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative 
history that the accommodation is not one that Con-
gress would have sanctioned.”118 
                                                                                                             
116 Id. 
117 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (Chevron is not ap-
plicable where a case involves a “pure question of statutory construction for 
the courts to decide.”). For a discussion of Cardoza-Fonseca, see Andrew N. 
Vollmer, SEC Revanchism and the Expansion of Primary Liability Under 
Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 273, 327–28 (2016). 
118 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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The Court concluded: 
In light of these well-settled principles it is clear that the 
Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in review-
ing the regulations at issue. Once it determined, after its own 
examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually 
have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble con-
cept to the permit program, the question before it was not 
whether in its view the concept is ‘inappropriate’ in the gen-
eral context of a program designed to improve air quality, but 
whether the Administrator’s view that it is appropriate in the 
context of this particular program is a reasonable one.119 
In summary, based on the Court’s recitation of these 
“well-settled principles,” and assuming that it makes a differ-
ence whether Chevron is found to apply to a particular statutory 
provision, Chevron applies when Congress (i) enacts a statute 
addressing or establishing a policy arising under the statutory 
regime entrusted to its administration by an agency possessed of 
the expertise to establish that policy, but (ii) does not set precise 
standards for determination of the policy. Under such circum-
stances, a court could reasonably conclude that Congress impliedly 
intended to delegate that policy decision to the agency.120 
                                                                                                             
119 Id. at 845. 
120 At the time of this Article, it is unclear whether the law concerning ju-
dicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutes is headed for a 
major change. See generally Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), in which 
Justice Gorsuch, in a concurring opinion in a case on judicial deference to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, in a passage in 
which he was joined by Justice Thomas: 
To be sure, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 
694 (1984), we sometimes defer to an agency’s construction of 
a statute. But there are serious questions, too, about whether 
that doctrine comports with the APA and the Constitution. 
See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–2121 (2018) 
(KENNEDY, J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699, 2713–2714 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring); Perez v. Mort-
gage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct, 1199, 1211–1213 (SCALIA, J., 
concurring in judgment) 
(citations omitted). Id. at 2446 n.114. Given the uncertainty of the future of 
Chevron, even absent the undeniable uncertainty about what it means and 
how it is to be applied, I assume in this Article that Chevron will not be re-
versed or materially limited or expanded.  
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2.The D.C. Circuit’s Montford Opinion 
 The D.C. Circuit held that “Section 4E is ambiguous”121 and 
that “the Commission’s interpretation of Section 4E, as not impos-
ing a jurisdictional bar, is reasonable and entitled to deference.”122 
“We thus do not need to address the Commission’s alternative 
argument that it had properly extended the deadline.”123 
 The court’s rationale for finding ambiguity was that Con-
gress, by not specifying any consequence for the Commission’s 
failure to bring an enforcement action within 180 days after 
issuing a Wells notification, had not “directly spoken to the pre-
cise question at issue.”124 The court rejected the respondents’ 
arguments “that Section 4E’s ‘language, structure, purpose, and 
legislative history all establish that the deadline is mandatory 
and jurisdictional,’”125 finding instead that “[w]hile these argu-
ments demonstrate that it might be reasonable to interpret Sec-
tion 4E as having a jurisdictional consequence, these arguments 
do not show that the statute forecloses other interpretations.”126 
 Since it concluded the “statute is silent ... with respect to 
the specific issue,” the court turned to “whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”127 
In answering this question, the court made no mention of any 
issue discussed in the Commission’s Opinion other than its in-
terpretation of two Supreme Court opinions concerning agency 
deadlines, Brock and James Daniel Good128 [hereinafter Good].129 
The court found that both cases held that statutory deadlines 
failing to prescribe a consequence for an agency’s missing them 
did not foreclose subsequent action, which the court found to be 
the case here.130 The court concluded: “Nothing in the text or 
                                                                                                             
121 Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
122 Id. at 81. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 82. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993) 
129 Id. at 82–83. 
130 Id. at 83. The court also cited a case decided after the Commission’s 
Opinion, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 411–14 (2015), which 
the Montford court said “reminded us ... [that] time limitations for filings in 
statutes are presumptively non-jurisdictional.” Id. Kwai involved claims by 
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structure of Section 4E overcomes the strong presumption that, 
where Congress has not stated that an internal deadline shall act 
as a statute of limitations, courts will not infer such a result.”131 
III.A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF MONTFORD 
 My overall evaluation of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in 
Montford is that it appeared to address the issue before it in an 
overly mechanistic manner and failed to grasp the key underly-
ing issue of whether summarily deferring to the Commission’s 
interpretation of section 4E was a commonsensical approach. 
 First, the court paid no apparent mind to the question of 
whether Chevron even applied.132 If, as it appears, Chevron ap-
plies where Congress has enacted a statute that addresses, but does 
not set precise standards on, a question of policy arising under a 
statutory regime entrusted to an agency possessed of the exper-
tise to establish that policy, then the Montford court erred by 
applying Chevron. The answer to this question can be found in 
looking closely at the nature of the issue before the court. 
 The issue in Chevron—whether non-attainment states 
should be permitted to regulate new stationary sources by 
grouping these individual sources on a plant-wide basis—is the 
quintessential policy question.133 And agency personnel, who 
make such decisions on a day-to-day basis, are obviously more 
qualified than a federal judge, by reason of experience, training, 
and role, to make that decision.134 It is thus very reasonable to 
believe that Congress, while not saying so, intended that the 
EPA, not the federal court, be the primary maker of that choice 
(subject to the constraints that the agency’s policy decision is not 
inconsistent with the statute and is “reasonable.”)135 
 By contrast to Chevron and the Clean Air Act, what Con-
gress meant when it enacted section 4E of the Exchange Act 
                                                                                                             
private parties against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
which established two deadlines to enable a plaintiff to sue. Finding that the 
deadlines were not “jurisdictional,” i.e., they did not act to “deprive[ ] a court 
of all authority to hear a case,” 575 U.S. at 408–09, the Court held that they 
were subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 419–20. 
131 Montford, 793 F.3d at 83. 
132 Id. 81–82. 
133 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984). 
134 Id. at 865–66.  
135 Id.  
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does not invite a “policy” choice at all; it is a matter of seeking 
its meaning by employing “traditional tools of statutory con-
struction.”136 It would be different, for example, if the case con-
cerned the SEC’s enactment of a rule defining a particular sort 
of securities transaction as a “manipulative or deceptive device 
or contrivance” under the Exchange Act.137 In such a case, the 
Commission can be assumed to have the expertise and experi-
ence, based on its overseeing the securities markets, to decide 
whether that sort of transaction is inherently manipulative or 
deceptive and merits being outlawed by one of its rules.138 
 But it requires no citation to establish that the SEC, no 
more than any other administrative agency, possesses no special 
expertise to determine the meaning of a statute, such as section 4E, 
that does not require any special substantive experience to supply 
the answer. It is true that the agency might have views on the 
subject, but so would an industry group or the citizenry at large. 
Additionally, it is important that the agency’s views, by defini-
tion, are subject to being influenced by the agency’s self-interest in 
expanding its authority or contracting the limits on its discre-
tion.139 This very real possibility makes the agency’s views less 
compelling.140 Moreover, from the beginning of the republic, courts 
                                                                                                             
136 Id. at 843 n.9. 
137 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
138 See Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (deferring to 
SEC under Chevron, citing the SEC’s expertise). 
139 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 233 (2006). 
140 “[W]hen an agency’s self-interest is so conspicuously at stake, Congress 
should not be taken to have implicitly delegated law-interpreting power to 
the agency.” Id. at 209–10. A corollary to the concern about deferring to an 
agency when its own authority is at stake is a concern about deferring to an 
agency position when, as in Montford, the position was first announced in a 
litigation context. See Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory 
Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the 
Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 452–58 (2013) (discussing different 
circuits’ decisions on whether agency interpretations announced in litigation 
merit deference under Skidmore); Sarah Zeleznikow, “Leaving the Fox in Charge 
of the Hen House”: Of Agencies, Jurisdictional Determinations and the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 275, 304–11 (2016) (discussing 
agency bias and self-interest within an agency and the questionable nature of 
the Chevron Doctrine); see also E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Smiley, 
138 S. Ct. 2563, 2563 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(citing Hubbard, supra, arguing for granting of certiorari to resolve circuit 
split on whether “an agency [can] advance an interpretation of a statute for 
the first time in litigation and then demand deference for its view”). 
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have been vested with the authority to say what the law is.141 Thus, 
it is more than reasonable to assert that following the “well-settled 
principles” underlying Chevron, the Montford court should have 
concluded that Chevron did not apply, and the court would owe 
the SEC’s reading of section 4E such deference as it deemed 
appropriate, which would not appear to be particularly great. 
 Second, let’s assume that I am wrong that Chevron does not 
apply. Did the Montford court appear to have answered question 
one correctly? The question, according to Chevron, is “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” or 
whether section 4E is, in another Chevron formulation of ques-
tion one, “ambiguous.”142  
 The Montford court’s analysis was limited to the simple 
holding that “[b]y not specifying any consequence for the Com-
mission’s failure to bring an enforcement action within 180 days 
after issuing a Wells notification, Congress has not ‘directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.’”143 Curiously, the court cited no 
authority in support of this answer to Question one.144 There-
fore, if this holding—that the only question is whether Congress 
explicitly spelled out the consequences of the agency’s missing a 
statutory deadline—is wrong as a matter of law, then the justi-
fiability of the D.C. Circuit’s and the SEC’s reliance on Brock 
(and on this supposed rule) disappears.  
 We are not left in the dark as to where Montford was 
looking when it proclaimed this simple test to be the law, for, in 
answering Question two, Montford, it found “[t]he Commission’s 
analysis of Supreme Court precedent, and its application of that 
precedent to Section 4E, is sound.”145 Specifically, the court noted 
                                                                                                             
141 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”). The 
issue of whether Chevron conflicts with Marbury and the vesting of judicial 
authority in Article III courts has been raised in numerous cases and com-
mentaries. See Aditya Bamzai, Marbury v. Madison and the Concept of Judi-
cial Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1057, 1057–58 (2016) (analyzing “seeming tension” 
between Chevron and Marbury). 
142 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
143 Montford and Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
144 Id.  
145 Montford, 793 F.3d at 83.  
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that the Commission had “discussed” Brock and Good.146 The court 
characterized the holdings in those two cases in the same manner 
as the SEC had in its Opinion:  
In Brock, the Court held that the Secretary of Labor’s failure 
to act by a 120-day deadline did not foreclose subsequent ac-
tion, where the statute did not identify a consequence for 
missing the deadline. ... In Good, the Court held that when “a 
statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with 
statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the 
ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.”147 
 However, the unavoidable truth is that the Montford court 
and the SEC plainly misstated the holding in Brock, as did the 
Supreme Court itself in Good. In Brock, a statute required the 
Secretary of Labor to issue a “final determination” of whether a 
grant recipient had misused job-training funds within 120 days 
of receiving a complaint.148 The Secretary missed the deadline 
but proceeded to seek to recover misused funds.149 The question 
was whether the Secretary’s failure to act within that period 
caused him to lose the power to recover misused funds.150 
 While the exact holding in Brock is muddled,151 one thing 
is absolutely clear: The Brock Court expressly stated that “[w]e 
                                                                                                             
146 Id. at 82–83. 
147 Id. at 83 (citations omitted). 
148 Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 254–55 (1986).  
149 Id. at 256–57.  
150 Id. at 253. 
151 Three possible holdings are suggested in Brock: 
(1) “We hold that CETA’s requirement that the Secretary ‘shall’ 
take action within 120 days does not, standing alone, divest 
the Secretary of jurisdiction to act after that time. There 
is simply no indication in the statute or its legislative his-
tory that Congress intended to remove the Secretary’s en-
forcement powers if he fails to issue a final determination on 
a complaint or audit within 120 days.” Id. at 266. 
(2) “We would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure 
of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids sub-
sequent agency action, especially when important public 
rights are at stake. When, as here, there are less drastic rem-
edies available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts 
should not assume that Congress intended the agency to 
lose its power to act.” Id. at 260 (footnote omitted). 
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need not, and do not, hold that a statutory deadline for agency 
action can never bar later action unless that consequence is stated 
explicitly in the statute.”152 How much more clearly could a court 
state what its holding was not? Since both the Montford court 
and the Commission—not to mention the Supreme Court in 
Good153—got Brock wrong, it becomes necessary to see if section 
4E of the Exchange Act can be meaningfully distinguished from 
the statute analyzed in Brock. There are in fact, many distinc-
tions between the two statutes.154 
 In Brock, the Court found that the “complainant” whose 
complaint was not acted on within the 120-day statutory period 
would have standing to bring an action in federal court to com-
pel agency action.155 Also,  
[i]f respondent is correct in arguing that Congress, in enacting 
[the applicable statute] intended to protect grant recipients 
from lengthy delays in audits, grant recipients such as re-
spondent would be within the zone of interests protected by 
[the statute], and would therefore have standing to bring an 
action under the APA to the same extent as a complainant.156  
                                                                                                             
(3) “[Even under respondent’s theory, § 106(b) cannot be juris-
dictional, because it would then permit the Secretary’s inac-
tion to prejudice individual complainants seeking to enforce 
their rights under CETA. We hold, therefore, that the mere 
use of the word ‘shall’ in § 106(b), standing alone, is not 
enough to remove the Secretary’s power to act after 120 
days.” Id. at 262. 
To avoid getting caught in the thicket of deciding exactly what the holding of 
Brock is, I consider both statements discussed in the text to be its holdings. 
See United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924) (where 
there are two grounds, upon either of which an appellate court may rest its 
decision, and it adopts both, the ruling on neither is obiter, but each is the 
judgment of the court, and of equal validity with the other) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). For an extensive discussion of how to 
identify the holding in a case, see Stephen E. Ryan, Guns and Dictum: Is the 
Fifth Circuit’s Finding of an Individual Right under the Second Amendment 
Dictum or Holding, 81 N.C. L. REV. 853, 856, 858 (2003) (describing “prescrip-
tive” and “descriptive” techniques of deriving ratio decidendi, or holding, of 
case; citing Title Ins. as using “prescriptive” technique). 
152 Brock, 476 U.S. at 262 n.9 (emphasis added). 
153 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993). 
154 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 4E(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1867 (2010). 
155 Brock, 476 U.S at 260 n.7. 
156 Id. 
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 No such comparable provision is contained in the Exchange 
Act, nor has it ever been suggested that any such procedures can 
be inferred to be available, in part because the typical SEC in-
vestigation does not contain the neat categories of complainant 
and grant recipients. Even if an investigatee could sue to compel 
the Commission to decide whether to sue or drop the case it would 
seem unrealistic, if not utterly foolhardy, for an investigatee to 
do so since the likely reaction of the SEC would be to jump off 
the fence and institute an enforcement action. 
 Another distinction is that, in Brock, the statute did more 
than require the Secretary to file an action; it required the Sec-
retary to resolve the entire dispute within the 120-day period.157 
“This is a more substantial task than filing a complaint, and the 
Secretary’s ability to complete it within 120 days is subject to 
factors beyond his control.”158 There is less reason, therefore, to 
believe that Congress intended such drastic consequences to follow 
from the Secretary’s failure to meet the 120-day deadline.159 By 
contrast, in the case of section 4E, all that is required is that the 
Commission file an action or decide to close the case within 180 
days of the Staff’s providing a written Wells notification which 
by definition is not done until nearly the end of the investigative 
process; moreover, the deadline can be extended.160 
 The Brock Court found direct support for its holding in 
the statute’s legislative history.161 Specifically in Brock, there 
was a floor colloquy in which the sponsor of an amendment con-
taining the deadline expressly agreed that a failure to meet the 
deadline would “not affect the Secretary’s jurisdiction in the 
matter.”162 The Court found the colloquy was not “controlling” 
but, because it was consistent with the statutory language and 
other legislative history, they found it to “provide evidence of 
Congress’ intent.”163 The Court also found that the statute of 
which the 120-day period was a part was aimed at “the growing 
incidence of fraud and misuse of CETA funds by state and local 
                                                                                                             
157 Id. at 266. 
158 Id. at 261.  
159 Id.  
160 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5(a)(2) (2012). 
161 Brock, 476 U.S. at 264–65. 
162 Id. at 263. 
163 Id. 
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governments,” and that “[a] primary purpose of the [statute] was 
to strengthen the Secretary’s hand in dealing with illegal prac-
tices.”164 By contrast, there is nothing in the legislative history 
of Dodd-Frank, as it directly pertains to section 4E, that sup-
ports the Montford holding.165 In fact, a fair reading of the legis-
lative history stands in stark contrast with the reading given the 
legislative history by both the SEC and the Montford court.166 
 Good held that the Government violated due process in a 
civil forfeiture case by seizing real property without giving the 
owner notice and an opportunity to be heard.167 To the point 
here, Good also held that a court could not dismiss a forfeiture 
action filed within the statute of limitations when government 
officials failed to comply with “a series of internal notification 
and reporting requirements,” including two “reporting up” re-
quirements and a mandate that a forfeiture action must be 
“immediately” and “forthwith” brought if the Attorney General 
believes one is warranted.168 
 The Court based that conclusion on its reading of two previ-
ous Supreme Court decisions, Brock and United States v. Montalvo-
Murillo,169 which the Good Court characterized has having “held 
that if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance 
with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the 
ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.”170 As we have 
already noted, that was not the holding in Brock and it is a stretch 
to say that Montalvo-Murillo conforms to this categorization.171 
 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 stated that a “judicial officer 
shall hold a hearing” to determine whether to grant bail to an 
arrested person and that “hearing shall be held immediately 
                                                                                                             
164 Id. 
165 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial 
Protection Act: A Brief Legislative History with Links, Reports, and Summaries, 
LAW LIBRARIANS SOC’Y OF WASH., D.C., http://www.llsdc.org/dodd-frank-legis 
lative-history [https://perma.cc/M9Y7-BVQU]. 
166 See infra text accompanying notes 174–211. 
167 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993). 
168 Id. at 48 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
169 495 U.S. 711 (1990). 
170 Good, 510 U.S. at 63. 
171 Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 717–21. 
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upon the person’s first appearance before the judicial officer.”172 
Montalvo-Murillo held that failure to hold an immediate hearing 
did not require release of the accused, rejecting the notion that 
there exists a “presumption or general rule that for every duty 
imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors 
there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures 
or omissions, even if negligent.”173 
 While the Court noted “the Act is silent on the issue of a 
remedy for violations of its time limits,” this was not the end of 
the Court’s discussion, just the beginning.174 The Court found it 
necessary to read the provision in context, “seek[ing] only a 
practical remedy, not one that strips the Government of all au-
thority to act.”175 This led to an analysis of the statute’s purpose 
and legislative history, which the Court found to be consistent 
with its conclusion.176 
                                                                                                             
172 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012) (emphasis added). 
173 Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 717. 
174 Id. at 716. 
175 Id. at 719. 
176 Id. at 718–19. Thus, the Court found that “[a]utomatic release contra-
venes the object of the statute: to provide fair bail procedures while protecting 
the safety of the public and assuring the appearance at trial of defendants found 
likely to flee.” Id. at 720. It also found: 
Assessing the situation in realistic and practical terms, it is 
inevitable that, despite the most diligent efforts of the Govern-
ment and the courts, some errors in the application of the time 
requirements of § 3142(f) will occur. Detention proceedings 
take place during the disordered period following arrest. As 
this case well illustrates, circumstances such as the involve-
ment of more than one district, doubts about whether the de-
fendant was subject to temporary detention under § 3142(d), 
and ambiguity in requests for continuances may contribute to 
a missed deadline for which no real blame can be fixed. In these 
situations, there is no reason to bestow upon the defendant a 
windfall and to visit upon the Government and the citizens a 
severe penalty by mandating release of possibly dangerous 
defendants every time some deviation from the strictures of 
§ 3142(f) occurs. 
Id. By contrast, there is nothing “disordered” about the period starting with a 
written Wells notification. Everything is under the Staff’s control. See Montford & 
Co., Investment Advisors Act Release Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC 
Docket 3763, 3770 n.60 (May 2, 2014) (citation omitted). The Staff can ensure 
that all its ducks are in a row before it provides the Wells notification, and, if 
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 Having established the shaky basis for Montford’s reli-
ance placed on Brock, I turn to the key issue of the purpose of 
section 4E as indicated on its face, illuminated by a reference to 
its context and legislative history. Notably, the D.C. Circuit did 
not discuss the purpose of section 4E, Dodd-Frank as a whole, or 
any portion of this vast Act.177 Reference, therefore, must be 
made to the Commission’s Opinion where it obliquely dealt with 
statutory purpose as part of an overall analysis that the D.C. 
Court found to be permissible.178 
A.The Purpose of Section 4E: Painting with a Proper-Sized Brush 
 In discussing the purpose of section 4E, the Commission 
painted with a very broad brush, indeed far too broad.179 It never 
searched for evidence of Congressional intent concerning section 
4E.180 Its comments on statutory purpose started off with a ref-
erence to the Act as a whole and its subtitle XII(B) (“Increasing 
Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies”),181 within which section 
4E was placed: 
Section 4E was enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, a stat-
ute that significantly expanded the Commission’s authority to 
police fraud in the securities industry. This particular provision 
                                                                                                             
there is a bona fide basis for one or more extensions, it can obtain an extension 
and postpone the deadline. 
177 Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
178 In re Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors Act Release 
No. 3829, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771–73 (May 2, 2014). 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 Id. at 3771 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 111-517, at 870–71 (2010)). Dodd-
Frank was organized into 16 titles. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376ï86 
(2010). One of these, Title IX (“Investor Protections and Improvements to the 
Regulation of Securities”) was divided into 10 subtitles, numbered as A–J. Id. 
at 1381–83. Section 929U—codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5, but adding to sec-
tion 4 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. at 
1867—was contained in subtitle B (“Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and 
Remedies”), the “section” to which the Commission referred in its Opinion. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 
(2012)); Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771. 
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was included under the [subtitle] of the Dodd-Frank Act titled 
“Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies,” which 
Congress explained at the time “strengthens the SEC’s au-
thority to conduct investigations.”182 
Then, taking note of a general Government-wide statute of limi-
tations, contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, the Commission further 
opined: 
In enacting Section 4E, Congress said nothing about creating a 
new abbreviated statute of limitations, either as a replacement 
for or a supplement to 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Moreover, it would be 
inconsistent with Congress’s intent to increase our authority to 
curb securities fraud under the Dodd-Frank Act section enacting 
Section 4E to read the provision as limiting our ability to act 
in a proceeding that otherwise meets the requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 2462. This is particularly true where, as here, dismissal 
of the action would harm the investing public by foreclosing 
the Commission from taking appropriate remedial measures.183 
 Had the Commission looked more closely at the legislative 
history of section 4E, it would have found language that cast 
serious doubt on the inference that its purpose was subsumed 
within a larger statutory purpose of “strengthen[ing]” (i.e., en-
hancing) the Commission’s statutory powers.184 Instead, a fair 
reading of the purpose of section 4E is that it stands on its own 
and that it is surrounded by strong expressions of Congressional 
dissatisfaction with the recent history of SEC enforcement.185 
 First, the context of section 4E(a)(1) makes clear it imposes 
a deadline.186 A “deadline” is “a fixed time limit: a date or time be-
fore which something must be done and after which the opportunity 
passes or a penalty follows.”187 This deadline says that the SEC 
                                                                                                             
182 Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket at 3771 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 111-
517, at 870–71 (2010)). 
183 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
184 Compare id., with H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, pt. 1, at 46–47, 78 (2010). 
185 See generally 156 CONG. REC. 9, 12430–34 (2010) (statement of Rep. 
Kanjorski). 
186 Congress recognized that Section 4E(a)(1) imposes a “deadline”—
section 4E is titled “Deadline for completing examinations, inspections and 
enforcement actions,” and the very next subsection, (a)(2), expressly, twice, 
refers to the 180-day period as “the deadline specified in paragraph (1).” Sec. 
929U, § 4, 124 Stat. at 1867–68 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)). 
187 Deadline, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). 
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Staff must either file an action or inform their superiors of an 
intent to drop the case by an easily determinable date, and it 
was entirely within the Commission’s control whether to do so or 
not.188 By contrast, Brock required a “determination” of misuse 
of funds to completed by a date certain but did not require filing 
an action by that date,189 and Good was focused on some inter-
nal reporting up deadlines as well as the commencement of a 
forfeiture action after the Attorney General found such an action 
warranted.190 Therefore on its face, the statute in Brock was 
silent on whether an action must be brought, so there is an obvi-
ous uncertainty as to the consequence of missing the deadline, 
and the statute in Good was inherently more ambiguous con-
cerning the consequence of missing the reporting-up deadlines or 
when a determination that follow-up was warranted was made.191 
But not so in the case of section 4E, which required by the speci-
fied date certain, “the Commission staff [to] either file an action 
against such person or provide notice to the Director of the Divi-
sion of Enforcement of its intent to not file an action.”192 In other 
words, a consequence of not suing by the deadline is expressly 
stated: either sue or drop the case.193 
 Moreover, the light cast on section 4E’s meaning by perti-
nent legislative history is far different from what was described 
by the Commission in its Opinion and cleared by the court.194 The 
Conference Report on the enacted version of Dodd-Frank deals 
directly with what became section 4E: “[Title IX Subtitle B, of Dodd-
Frank] requires the SEC to complete investigations and exami-
nations within certain time frames, subject to exceptions for 
complex cases.”195 Virtually the same language was contained in 
a House Report on H.R. 3817, an earlier version of section 4E: 
“This section generally requires the SEC to complete enforcement 
                                                                                                             
188 Sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. at 1867–68 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)). 
189 Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 254 (1986). 
190 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993). 
191 Compare Brock, 476 U.S. at 266, with Good, 510 U.S. at 64–65. 
192 Sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. at 1867 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)). 
193 See id. 
194 Compare H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 871 (2010) and H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, 
pt. 1, at 78 (2010), with Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advi-
sors Act Release Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771–73 
(May 2, 2014). 
195 H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 871. 
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investigations within 180 days after staff provides a written Wells 
notice to any person. The section contains exceptions for complex 
actions.”196 This language does not speak of enhancing Commis-
sion enforcement authority; rather, it tends to narrow it.197 Moreo-
ver, it appears to leave no doubt as to Congress’s intent if the 
Commission’s staff failed to file an action within the deadline, 
and, to boot, it provided a safety valve for the Staff, to seek an 
extension of the deadline.198 
 In addition, the Conference Report on Dodd-Frank, and the 
rest of Dodd-Frank itself, say far more about Commission en-
forcement than that the Act “strengthens the SEC’s authority to 
conduct investigations,”199 (which is how the Commission’s Opin-
ion in Montford/SEC characterizes the purpose of section 4E).200 
The statute as a whole, and especially Title IX, simply cannot be 
seen simply as a bouquet thrown the Commission’s way.201 Instead, 
it is filled with provisions aimed at changes in the Commission’s 
overall operations.202 
 Thus, Subtitle A (“Increasing Investor Protection”), 
establishes mechanisms to assist investors in their dealings 
with the SEC by creating an Office of Investor Advocate and 
an Ombudsman. It also creates an Investor Advisory Committee 
at the SEC, and clarifies the authority of the SEC to engage 
in investor testing. Subtitle A directs the SEC to study the 
standards of care applicable to broker-dealers and investment 
advisers giving investment advice to retail customers, and it 
authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules imposing a fiduciary 
duty on broker-dealers and investment advisers to protect retail 
customers. In addition, the subtitle streamlines filing procedures 
for self-regulatory organizations. Subtitle A also clarifies the 
authority of the SEC to require investor disclosures before 
purchase of investment products and services. Finally, the 
                                                                                                             
196 H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 78.  
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
199 H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 870. 
200 Montford/SEC, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771. 
201 See 156 CONG. REC. 9,12432 (2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 46–47. 
202 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 929U, § 4, 124 Stat. 1376, 1867–68 (2010) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)); H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 871; see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-687, at 78. 
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subtitle requires studies on the enhancement of investment advis-
er examinations, financial literacy, mutual fund advertising, 
conflicts of interest, improved investor access to information on 
investment advisers and broker-dealers, and financial plan-
ners and the use of financial designations.203 
 Additionally, Title IX, Subtitle F (“Improvements to the 
Management of the Securities and Exchange Commission”) “re-
quires several reports designed to assess SEC performance and 
provide recommendations for improvements ... related to internal 
supervisory controls, personnel management, financial controls, 
and oversight of national securities associations.”204 Subtitle F 
also “requires the SEC to hire a consultant to study the SEC’s oper-
ations and determine whether there is a need for comprehensive 
reform.”205 It also “creates a suggestion program for SEC em-
ployees and requires the Divisions of Trading and Markets and 
Investment Management to have examiners on their staffs” and 
“requires the GAO to study issues surrounding employees who 
leave the SEC to work in the securities industry.”206 
 Thus, it is evident by the number of studies that this Title 
required that Congress not only wanted to provide broader au-
thority to the SEC in certain specified circumstances but also to 
require the SEC to clean up its act in various areas.207 Moreover, 
it is useful to recall the historical context in which Dodd-Frank was 
enacted. It came on the heels of the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, and soon after the revelation of the Madoff 
scandal, a multi-year, multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme that the 
SEC enforcement staff was handed on a silver platter, but somehow 
managed to fail to uncover for years.208 In addition, at the same 
                                                                                                             
203 H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 870. 
204 Id. at 873. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 See id. at 870, 873–74. 
208 See generally OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, SEC, OIG-509, INVESTIGATION 
OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME at 1–2 
(2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3DN 
-HT54]. Ironically, one SEC Enforcement staffer told the SEC’s OIG that one 
of the causes of the Commission’s failure to uncover what Madoff was up to 
was that a key staffer was spending so much of her time closing old investi-
gations. “That’s what [she] spent a lot of her time doing, writing closing 
memos because she had inherited a branch where everybody had left and left 
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time another massive securities fraud, Stanford, was allowed by 
staff inaction to grow exponentially for fourteen years after the 
SEC examiners had concluded this was likely a Ponzi scheme before 
the Commission took enforcement action.209 As a result, many Con-
gressmen and Senators were not happy with the SEC’s record.  
B.The Views of the Sponsor of Section E 
 The SEC’s record was openly criticized210 by Rep. Paul E. 
Kanjorski, Chair of the House Financial Services Subcommittee 
on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored En-
terprises.211 On October 1, 2009, he issued a “discussion draft” of a 
proposed bill, the Investor Protection Act of 2009, containing, 
among other things, what seemed to amount to a statute of limi-
tation: it would have required the SEC “to complete any exami-
nation, investigations, or enforcement action initiated by the 
Commission not later than 180 days after the date on which 
such examination, inspection, or enforcement action is com-
menced.”212 After significant modification, this provision was 
                                                                                                             
these old cases in shambles, and you had to go back to the court records, 
pulling all these court files, and recreating files to close them.” Id. at 366. 
209 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEC, OIG-526, INVESTIGATION OF 
THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S 
ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME at 149 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig 
/reports/investigations/2010/oig-526.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DES-Y9KW]. 
210 See generally The Stanford Ponzi Scheme: Lessons for Protecting Investors 
from the Next Securities Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. On Fin. Services, 112th Cong. 1 (2012). In addition 
to the SEC’s highly visible problems with respect to Madoff and Stanford, the OIG 
issued a highly critical report on the then–Enforcement Director’s communi-
cation with her predecessor concerning the Commission’s ongoing investigation 
of an entity not represented by the former Director. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, SEC, OIG-502, ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER DISCLOSURES AND AS-
SURANCES GIVEN at 45–46 (2009), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports 
/investigations/2009/oig-502.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWY6-DGVQ]. 
211 See Subcommittee Assignments for the 111th Congress, HOUSE FIN. 
SERVS. COMMITTEE, https://web.archive.org/web/20100608223332/http://finan 
cialservices.house.gov/subassignments.html [https://perma.cc/J67X-RPY4]. 
212 See Davis Polk Client Memorandum, Representative Kanjorski Releases 
Investor Protection, Private Investment Fund Advisers Registration and Federal 
Insurance Office Proposals, Oct. 6, 2009, https://www.davispolk.com/files/files 
/Publication/948e554f-2037-4f0e-81eb-001bc52e4762/Preview/PublicationAttach 
ment/43b23898-544a-4344-bfbb-9c30be53402c/100609_Kanjorski.pdf. There 
is no record on why this draft provision was so substantially modified by the 
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enacted in Dodd Frank as section 4E.213 Months before his intro-
duction of H.R. 3817, his subcommittee had held hearings on the 
Madoff fiasco, “using” in his words, “the largest known instance of 
securities fraud as a case study to guide the work of the Financial 
Services Committee in reshaping and reforming our Nation’s finan-
cial services regulatory system.”214 Chairman Kanjorski (also 
Chairman of the Subcommittee) expressed the view that the 
securities regulatory “motor is broken beyond repair. We therefore 
need to invent a new engine to ensure that the securities regula-
tory system reflects today’s realities and can respond effectively to 
tomorrow’s innovations.”215 When top Commission officials, citing 
an ongoing investigation, refused to comment on the specifics of 
the Madoff case, including why the SEC never caught the fraud, 
Congressman Kanjorski had a strong reaction: “[T]he lack of coop-
eration shown in the last several weeks, and I think the abuse of 
authority or the attempt to bring a protective shield over an exec-
utive agency or independent agency of this government is not ac-
ceptable.”216 
 Notably, he also expounded on the issue of excessive delays 
in SEC enforcement: 
Let me just say that justice delayed very often is justice denied. 
And if we are going to have cooperation, and we are going to 
have an effective enforcement tool of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, we cannot have the culture or mentality 
                                                                                                             
time it became law. One problem with the original version was that it re-
quired an “SEC enforcement action” (without clarifying whether this referred 
only to an administrative proceeding or also to a civil action) to be completed 
within 180 days of its commencement—far too short a period to give respond-
ents or defendants an opportunity to prepare their defense and, in any event, 
outside the control of the Commission if it were applied to a civil (court) ac-
tion. See id. In any event, neither the SEC nor the Montford court commented 
on the evolution of this provision in their respective opinions. See Montford & 
Co. v. SEC (Montford/SEC), 793 F.3d 76, 81–83 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Montford & 
Co., Investment Advisors Act Release Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC 
Docket 3763, 3771–73 (May 2, 2014). 
213 H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, pt. 1, at 48 (2010).  
214 Assessing The Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Spon-
sored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 1 (2009), 
http://library.clerk.house.gov/reference-files/111_fin_005.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/XQK5-PD2X]. 
215 Id. at 2. 
216 Id. at 59. 
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that I sense over there that in examination and investigation, 
a process can go on forever. I mean, I have stories that will 
shrivel your ears with how long enforcement proceedings have 
just laid around with no action having been taken. I am get-
ting the impression that is the culture now, that there is not 
an intent to do something. 
So one of the things the committee will be considering in some 
of this legislation is whether or not we can impose a 180-day 
rule. You know, if we can get criminal prosecutions within 180 
days in this country, it seems to me once we charge some corpo-
rate activity as being a violation of the SEC, let us move along; 
180 days get to a trial, let us get it decided. Something like this.217 
 Later, during the markup of H.R. 3817, Rep. Kanjorski, 
after reviewing the Inspector General’s Madoff Report, stated, 
“‘it became eminently clear’ that the SEC was ‘a dysfunctional 
agency’ that could not protect investors if it ‘does not implement 
the laws’ Congress enacts.”218 Finally, when he spoke on the House 
floor at the time the full House considered what had become 
Dodd-Frank, Rep. Kanjorski made no secret of his belief that the 
SEC needed more than new legislative authority to cure its prob-
lems.219 In addition to providing the SEC with more manpower, 
the bill dealt with “the SEC’s systemic failures to effectively police 
the markets in recent years,”220 which 
required Congress to do even more to shake up the agency’s 
daily operations. As such, the legislation includes my provi-
sion mandating an expeditious, independent, comprehensive 
study of the securities regulatory regime by a high caliber body 
with expertise in organizational restructuring to identify defi-
ciencies and reforms, and ensure that the SEC and other reg-
ulatory entities put in place further improvements designed 
to provide superior investor protection.221 
He concluded with a direct reference to what would become sec-
tion 4E: “The final bill also includes my deadlines generally forc-
ing the SEC to complete enforcement, compliance examinations, 
                                                                                                             
217 Id. at 61. 
218 See Pet’r’s Br. at 24–25, Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (quoting Representative Kanjorski, Remarks at the House Financial 
Services Committee Mark-up (Oct. 27, 2009) (video recording), available at 
http://financialserv.edgeboss.net/wmedia/financialserv/markup102709.wvx). 
219 156 CONG. REC. 9,12432 (2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski).  
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
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and inspections within 180 days, with some limited exemptions 
for complex cases.”222 Manifestly, “forcing” a deadline on the 
agency is far from promulgating a deadline that the SEC can 
treat as an “internal timing directive.”223 
 The spoken and written words of Congressman Kanjorski 
merit emphasis because of his role in the enactment of section 
4E.224 Not only do they illustrate the depth of his dissatisfaction 
with the performance of the SEC, but they support the conclu-
sion that the purpose of section 4E was, as his remarks stated, 
to “forc[e]” the SEC to act within the 180-day deadline or get an 
extension.225 The SEC’s view, which is supported by the D.C. 
Circuit, was that such an interpretation conflicted with the pur-
portedly sole purpose of Title IX of Dodd-Frank, i.e., to buttress 
the Commission’s authority.226 In reality, the remarks of section 
4E’s sponsor and the other provisions of Dodd-Frank show that 
the intent was not simply to increase Commission authority, but 
also to require changes in its operations.227 
IV.IS SECTION 4E DEAD? 
 While there is no guarantee that an attempt to convince a 
court to interpret section 4E differently than it was interpreted in 
Montford would be successful, it would appear that, where the 
facts allow an argument that an SEC case was tardily filed un-
der section 4E, it would be worth the attempt. This is because 
the SEC and the courts, in viewing section 4E, misread Supreme 
                                                                                                             
222 Id. (emphasis added). 
223 Compare id., with Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors 
Act Release Nos. IA-3829; AP-3-14536, 108 SEC Docket 3763, 3771–73 (May 2, 
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Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 82–83 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
227 The statements of the sponsor of legislation “are an authoritative guide 
to the statute’s construction.” N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 
526–27 (1982); accord Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (stating 
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history, they provide evidence of Congress’ intent.”). Thus, at least to the 
extent that a particular Supreme Court majority is, today, willing to consider 
legislative history, the statements of a statutory provision’s author merit a 
level of special attention. See id.; N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 526ï27. 
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Court precedent and overlooked significant evidence of legislative 
intent that conflicts with the rather simplistic view that treating 
section 4E as a statute of limitation conflicted with the purpose of 
enacting subtitle IX of Dodd-Frank (strengthening the SEC’s en-
forcement arsenal).228 As I have shown, there is plenty of evidence 
that Congress had the intention to, in Congressman Kanjorski’s 
words, “forc[e]” the SEC to bring cases within the deadline.229 
 A final judicial resolution to what section 4E means ulti-
mately awaits decision by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. For the present, however, given the fact that there is no 
inter-Circuit conflict, there is no immediate prospect that there 
ever will be an occasion for the Court to determine what section 
4E means. Thus, one might conclude that we lawyers can only 
reach our own private conclusions unless we have a client that 
can and will test this issue in litigation. But before we conclude 
that a court case is the only way to solve this problem, let us 
consider the possible role of the SEC or the Congress. 
 Is there any hope that a future SEC will decide to reinter-
pret section 4E and treat it like a limitations statute? The fact is 
that, given the safety valve enacted into the statute by the addi-
tion of the possibility of an extension ad infinitum, even were the 
Commission so to decide, this action would be of dubious signifi-
cance unless the Staff or the Commission were to take the initia-
tive by deciding to limit the number or length of extensions.230 
Even if no such change were enacted, the Staff or the Commission 
can turn down meritless extension requests—extensions caused by 
sheer inefficiency or foot-dragging.231 If flimsy extension requests 
were denied, “violations” of the statute would appear almost 
impossible if someone at the SEC is minding the store.232 Then, 
assuming proper planning on the part of the Staff, such violations 
                                                                                                             
228 See Brock, 476 U.S. at 263; N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 526ï27. 
Compare Montford & Co. (Montford/SEC), Investment Advisors Act Release 
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232 See id. 
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would occur only if a particular request for an extension is so 
unreasonable that it is, unexpectedly, not granted.233 
 Thus, properly understood, section 4E should not be 
viewed as much of a shackle as far as the Commission or its staff 
are concerned.234 If the statute is not to be rendered a complete 
nullity, the Commission would be well-advised to adopt a new 
interpretation of this section and give it the teeth its Staff needs 
to understand the need to avoid the age-old problem of excessive 
delay. However, realism intrudes and suggests that there is vir-
tually no chance any of this would happen: if the Commission 
felt that a particular staff recommendation took too long to reach 
“the table,” as Commission consideration was called in my day, 
then it can always deny the recommendation. 
 Finally, the issue can be reconsidered in Congress. Surely 
Congress could make the statute clearer and, perhaps, even wiser. 
As far as clarity is concerned, if Congress either believed that 
the original statute, as enacted, was intended to act as a limita-
tions statute, or concluded that, whatever the intent of Congress 
in enacting section 4E, making it a limitations statute would be 
wise policy, it could either instruct the SEC in, say, an appropri-
ations bill to “reinterpret” section 4E, or it could amend it by 
explicitly stating that it is a limitations statute (or by clarifying 
in no uncertain term that filing or closing was required within 
180 days of a Wells notification, or some other measurement of a 
deadline). Congress could create a new, shorter limitations period 
for SEC enforcement proceedings than the general federal limi-
tations statute, which establishes a limitation period of five 
years from when “the claim first accrued.”235 Or Congress could 
add more days to the 180-day deadline and permit only one 90-
day extension.236 The alternatives are endless, and all would be 
an improvement on the status quo. 
 In the meantime, were a defendant or respondent litigat-
ing an enforcement case with the SEC to raise a section 4E de-
fense if one were available, there is a strong basis to attempt to 
persuade a court of appeal that Montford was wrongly decided. 
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